A New Kind Of Science? [4] | Home: http://pwall.net |
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But the principal has been established. An extremely
simple Cellular Automaton with an absurdly simple set of
rules can produce behaviour with a level of complexity out
of all proportion to its starting point. So what could a
more complex CA, with more dimensions, more states and a
more detailed set of rules, do?
This was the starting point for Wolfram's explorations, and
here I must admit that I've read only a small part of the
book. Given the size of the book and the density of its
contents, it may take several months to read it, so here
I'm going to have to skip to what I understand to be
Wolfram's conclusions.
What Wolfram appears to be saying is that some phenomenon
analogous to Cellular Automata may underly the basic laws
of physics. He demonstrates that CA with rules not too much
more complicated than those discussed here can display
coherent behaviors like those of a turing machine, so why
couldn't CA be the mechanism behind quarks and bosons?
After all, is this so much more ridiculous than
conceptualizing a subatomic particle as an excitation of a
10-dimensional string, which is what current string theories
would suggest?
Cellular Automata would explain concepts like the speed
of light - if cells can only be affected by those in their
immediate vicinity, that gives the effect of an absolute
speed of light. In fact, I remember some of the earliest
discussions I read on CA referring to the fastest speed at
which an effect could travel through the cells as the
"speed of light".
And the nonlocal effects of quantum entanglement that so
trouble theoretical physicists could be explained by a
rule which only came into play in certain circumstances,
but which took into account the state of cells other than
those immediately adjacent.
There is one important consequence of this - unlike
Newtonian physics, in which mathematical formulae can
predict, say, the position of a planet, the only way to
know state n of a Cellular Automaton is to get
there via state n-1. Where groups of cells
operate together as macro-phenomena, like the gliders in
Life, it's reasonably easy to predict their behaviour at
a certain level. But when complex interactions take
place, like a glider hitting a random group of cells,
the only way to know what will happen is to play the
program.
This means that it will never be possible to create
formulae that enable us to predict outcomes at the very
smallest level. Even if we fully understand the rules
of this hypothetical Cellular Automaton that underlies
the physical world, we will never be able to run a
simulation of it as fast as nature runs itself. And
since a small change to just one cell can have a major
effect throughout the system, as with Life, the only way
to know what will happen is to play the program - which
in this case we can't do.
If this is indeed what Wolfram is saying, and I'll know
more when I've finished the book, then I think his ideas
have merit. I disagree with a lot of what he says - I
don't think the ideas are as new as he suggests, and I
think he should give more credit to the pioneers in the
field of Cellular Automata, like von Neumann and Conway.
And I certainly don't like the way his ego intrudes so
heavily into his writing style.
But underneath all that, he may be on to something.
I should just mention here that Wolfram goes on from
these initial conclusions to state what he calls the
Principle of Computational Equivalence. I won't attempt
to explain this until I've read more about it, but I
suspect that he may be going a little far here. Further
than I'm prepared to agree with, anyway.
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